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JULIE WEAVER AND CATHERINE 
PALMER, 
APPELLANTS, 
-vs-
BRITE MUSIC ENTERPRISES, 
INC. , 
APPELLEE. 
Case No, 950512-CA 
REPLY OF APPELLANTS 
The matter before the Court relates to the construction of the 
following provision (the "Subject Paragraph") of the agreement 
between the Appellants, Julie weaver and Catherine Palmer, and the 
Appellee, Brite Music Enterprises, Inc. ("Brite"). 
As vou continue to exceed 1200 points per 
month, the increasing carry-over points may 
accumulate for as long as you desire; however, 
each increment of 5,000 carry-over points is 
redeemable for a check from Brite for $100. 
Redeeming points in this manner does not 
affect your life-time point accumulation or 
the benefits you may eventually derive 
therefrom, (emphasis added by Appellants) 
The question to be answered by this Court is; did the trial court 
commit error by deciding, as a matter of law, who had the right to 
redeem the carry-over points? 
The question of who had the redemption right is central to 
this case on appeal. The Appellate Court may answer this question 
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as a matter of law, if it determines that the Subject Provision is 
unambiguous; or, if the Court determines that the provision is 
uncertain or ambiguous, the Court should remand this question of 
law and fact to a jury to properly determine who had the right to 
redeem the carry-over points. 
Because this matter was decided at the trial court on a Motion 
for Directed Verdict, the Appellate Court should give no deference 
to the factual findings or legal conclusions of the trial court. 
Canfield v. Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224 (Ut. App. 1992). 
POINT I 
ASSUMING THAT THE CONTRACTUAL PROVISION AT 
ISSUE IS UNAMBIGUOUS, THE TRIAL COURT FAILED 
TO INTERPRET THE CONTRACT SO AS TO HARMONIZE 
ALL OF ITS PROVISIONS. THE APPEALS COURT IS 
TO GIVE NO DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
INTERPRETATION AND THE APPEALS COURT IS TO 
CONSTRUE THE CONTRACTUAL PROVISION AT ISSUE IN 
LIGHT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION 
APPLICABLE TO UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACTUAL 
PROVISIONS. 
Both in the statement of Brite's first argument, and in its 
conclusion, counsel for Brite states that Appellants have failed to 
carry their burden of proof. Burden of proof is a factual analysis 
that cannot be determined on a Motion for Directed Verdict, if any 
evidence is presented in opposition thereto. Although a trial 
court can interpret an ambiguous contract as a matter of law, and 
thereby resolve a dispute, the trial court cannot take a factual 
issue (requiring a burden of proof analysis), away from a jury on 
a Motion for Directed Verdict. 
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In this Court's recent decision of Klienert v. Kimball 
Elevator Company, 1995 WL 613775, 275 Utah adv. Rep. 44, (Ut. App. 
10/19/95), this Court held that: 
On appeal from a directed verdict, 'we must 
examine the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and if there is 
a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would 
support a judgment in favor of the losing 
party, the directed verdict cannot be 
sustained.' Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural 
Educ. Rec. Ass'n. , 845 p.2d 242, 243 (Utah 
1992) (quoting Graystone Pines, 652 P. 2d at 
898) . Where there is any evidence that raises 
a question of material fact, no matter how 
improbable the evidence may appear, judgment 
as a matter of law is improper. See Hill v. 
Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P. 2d 241, 246 
(Utah 1992). (emphasis added) 
The Brief of the Appellee is directed against the use of 
the principles of construction that relate to ambiguous provisions 
of a contract. Brite disregards the principles of construction 
that are applicable to contractual provisions that are not 
ambiguous. This portion of the Appellants' Reply Brief will 
address the construction of an unambiguous provision. 
The Appellants and Brite have both made reference to the fact 
that there are three logical possibilities for the construction of 
the subject language (Appellants' Brief at p. 28,. Appellee's Brief 
at p. 13), these are: (1) that only the sales representatives can 
exercise the redemption provision; (2) that both the sales 
representatives and Brite can exercise the redemption provision; or 
(3) that only Brite can exercise the redemption provision. To 
determine that the Subject Paragraph is not ambiguous, it is 
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necessary to conclude, as a matter of law, that one of the three 
possibilities is the proper construction. 
In order for this Court to find that the provision is not 
ambiguous, it must find within the four corners of the Subject 
Paragraph something that establishes who had the right to exercise 
the redemption provision. 
Because the party who may redeem the carry-over points is not 
expressly identified in the second sentence of the paragraph in 
question, the only analysis that is helpful to making this 
determination is one of harmonizing the subject paragraph as a 
whole, and giving effect to all of its terms. The Utah Supreme 
Court, in speaking of unambiguous contractual provisions which may 
be interpreted as a matter of law, stated in the case of Buehner 
Block v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988), that: 
[t]he interpretation of a written contract may 
be a question of law determined by the words 
in the agreement. In this regard, a cardinal 
rule in construing such a contract is to give 
effect to the intentions of the parties, and 
if possible, these intentions should be 
gleaned from an examination of the text of the 
contract itself. Additionally, it is 
axiomatic that a contract should be 
interpreted 
provisions 
its terms 
i so 
and 
as 
all 
should 
to 
of 
be 
harmonize 
its 
criven 
terms, 
all 
and 
effect if 
of 
all 
it 
its 
of 
is 
possible to do so. (emphasis added) 
It is compelling that the antecedent of every other phrase in 
the paragraph refers exclusively to the sales representative by the 
use of the pronouns "you" or "your". There is nothing in the 
language that possibly inserts the notion that Brite had the right 
to exercise the redemption provision, or any other right in the 
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Subject Paragraph. The only reference to Brite is to indicate that 
Brite is the source of the funds for the redemption of the carry-
over points, if the person having the right to redeem exercises 
such right. 
The fact that Brite is the source of the funds is totally 
unhelpful in answering the question of who had the right to 
exercise the redemption of the points. The fact that Brite was the 
source of the funds is completely consistent with the conclusion 
that the sales representative alone had the right to redeem the 
carry-over points, which Brite would pay for. As the sales 
representative continued "to exceed 1,200 points per month" and as 
the sales representative chose, in the alternative, to accumulate 
those points "for as long as you [the sales representative] 
desire", the redemption provision merely provided the sales 
representative with the option to redeem for cash instead of 
continuing to accumulate his or her carry-over points. 
The second compelling argument based upon the objective of 
harmonizing, and giving effect to, all of the provisions of the 
paragraph is the expressly stated concept that the sales 
representative could accumulate the carry-over points for as long 
as the sales representative desired. This clearly stated right of 
the sales representative is contained in the first part of the 
single sentence describing the accumulation and redemption of the 
carry-over points. The sentence helps us to convincingly answer 
the question; "Who can redeem the points?" 
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It is logically inconsistent, and would totally disregard the 
notion of harmonizing all portions of this single sentence, to say 
that Brite could exercise the redemption provision when the 
contractual term clearly says that the sales representatives could 
accumulate the points for as long as they wanted to. Assuming that 
the trial court's construction of this provision is correct, Brite 
gave an unfettered right to the sales representative to accumulate 
carry-over points indefinitely, then took that right away in the 
very same breath. 
When construed in the light most favorable to the Appellants, 
and construed in a manner to harmonize and give effect to the 
entire contractual provision, the Appeals Court should determine 
that the carry-over point redemption provision could only be 
exercised by the Appellant sales representatives. 
POINT II 
BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY WITH CERTAINTY THE 
PARTY WHO CAN EXERCISE THE CARRY-OVER POINT 
REDEMPTION PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT, BRITE 
HAS RENDERED THE PARAGRAPH UNCERTAIN AND 
AMBIGUOUS. THE CONTRACTUAL PROVISION AT ISSUE 
MUST THEN BE INTERPRETED IN LIGHT OF THE 
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION APPLICABLE 
TO UNCERTAIN OR AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT PROVISION. 
Brite argues in its Brief that several of the principles of 
construction urged by the Appellants are not applicable in this 
matter, because the trial court determined that the Subject 
Paragraph was unambiguous. As stated above, this Court can make 
its own determination regarding this conclusion without giving 
deference to the determination of the trial court. If, however, 
the identity of the person who can exercise the redemption clause 
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is at all uncertain or ambiguous, each of the legal principles 
referred to herein are applicable. 
With regard to the ambiguity of this provision, Brite/s own 
counsel acknowledges the uncertainty. During the examination of 
Mr. Vassel1 at trial, the following discussion took place (Vassel 
p. 52). The questions are by Brite's counsel: 
Q I want to clarify that we are not talking about 
accumulating points here. We are talking about redeeming 
those points? 
A Okay. 
Q Clearly, and I have no problem with the fact that a 
marketing associate [i.e. the sales representative] can 
elect to redeem if they choose to, right? 
A Right. 
Q Is there anything in this that says that the company 
cannot redeem also? 
A Doesn't say either way. 
Q Right. Just says they [the carry-over points] can 
be redeemed, doesn't it? (emphasis added) 
Since it "doesn't say either way" whether or not Brite has the 
right to redeem the carry-over points, it is entirely appropriate 
for the Appellate Court to determine that the provision is 
uncertain or ambiguous. 
A determination of ambiguity is particularly appropriate when 
there is uncertainty as to which party to a contract is empowered 
with a specific right. A case in point is that of Cruz v. Molina, 
1
 Mr. Vassel was the former executive vice president of Brite. 
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788 F.Supp. 122, 124 (D. Puerto Rico 1992). A copy of the case is 
included as Exhibit flB" in the Addendum to this Reply Brief. 
tle Cruz case, a written lease gave a right of termination 
t o on.. . t^e p a r t^ e s^ j^. w a s uncxea:t: jr 1: lowever, which party' had 
the right to exercise the termination provision. Although the 
lease was i i I the Spanish language, the principle applied in the 
case hhi'tl not.hmq tn tin with tin1 lanqikiq*1 iri  wh i rh the lease was 
written. The court, however, determined that the provision was 
ambiguous, and stated as follows: 
The clause is ambiguous because it is unclear 
who has the right to terminate upon advance 
notice, (emphasis added) 
In construing the ambiguous provision now before this Court, 
the scrivener of t document; (b) what the parol evidence was 
regarding the answer to the question of who had the right to 
< .- • redempt ion pi: ov i s i on; a nd (c) wl iat th e coi i:i : s e o f 
dealing had been between the parties for more than eight years with 
regard to this provision. In fact, this testimony was received by 
the tr la] court and heard by the jury, without objection by counsel 
for Brite. 
Based upon this testimony, and the uncertainty as to the 
cei iti: al i ssue of this matter, it was error for the trial court to 
grant the Motion for Directed Verdict and remove these factual 
issues from the consideration of the jur) . 
The evidence was clear that the sole scrivener of the document 
was Brite and its agents (Brady p. 10, lines 8-16; quoted at page 
• ". •"' ' . " . •.' . . l i 
24 of Appellants' original Brief). Because of the uncertainty as 
to who had the right to exercise the redemption provision, and the 
principle of law that the contract is to be interpreted against the 
scrivener, Abbott v. Christensen, 660 P.2d, 254, 257 (Utah 1983), 
the question of the interpretation of the contract should have been 
submitted to the jury, with a proper instruction regarding this 
principle of construction. 
Extensive testimony was also introduced by the Appellants, 
including testimony of admissions made by Brite's executive 
officers, that only the sales representatives had the right to 
exercise the redemption provision (Palmer pp. 31-33; p. 86, lines 
9-12; p. 90, lines 2-3; Vassel p. 39; and see the text of Catherine 
Palmer's testimony as quoted at pages 39 and 40 of the original 
Brief of the Appellants). 
This parol evidence, and other testimony given at the trial, 
supported a long-standing course of dealing between the parties 
that only the sales representatives were entitled to exercise the 
redemption provision (Palmer p. 86, lines 9-12; p. 90, lines 2-3). 
Further, the purpose of the carry-over points should be 
considered in harmonizing the language of the provision. The 
testimony received at trial regarding the purpose of the carry-over 
points was that the points were to be used to maintain the highest 
compensation level, at times when a sales representative devoted 
less time to personal sales activity. This use included retirement 
(Vassel P. 22, lines 9-13), maternity leave (Brady p. 18), sick 
leave (Brady p. 19), etc. 
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•- The" former Hxprutivc vii-p pipsidonl of Hr i t *-j explained these 
purposes large sales meetings of 75 to 200 sales representatives 
/arious states. At page 2 3 of his testimony, Mr. Vassel said 
his d i.sruss i emu with sd 1 es repres 
This month I will work hard, I will sell and 
sponsor and I will get points for both, but 
next month if I'm sick or next month if I, 
even though my business efforts don't hit 
1,200, the company permits me to take the 
difference and get up to that 1,200 level.' 
And so, I mean, it was a marvelous plan and we 
openly extolled it, and we went around saying, 
look at Julie Weaver, look at Catherine 
Palmer, look at Nedra. These people have one 
or two or three years where they literally 
could retire or have a baby or whatever and 
the carryover points were still there for 
them. 
These maiiiis should have been 'properly submitted to the 
jurors to consider the inconsistency of stating that, on the one 
hand, the carry-over points could be accumulated by a sales 
representative for (a) years of retirement (h\ months of maternity 
leave, or (c) years of church missionary service, if t was Brite 
who could exercise the redemptio »rovisi< the 
accumulated points for a few hundred dollars. The redemption 
payment would be totally inadequate to provide the benefits as 
represented by the President ai id ot .her execut J ve offi cers of Br :i te. 
Given three opportunities to explain such inconsistency, Mr. Brady2 
2
 A founder and the president of Brite (Brady i , r- and 6). 
could not reconcile such diametrically opposed notions. At the 
trial, Mr. Brady testified as follows: 
Q Now, if in drafting these terms that you've 
indicated so far, Mr. Brady, if Brite Music could redeem 
at will for $100, wouldn't that be incon — if the right 
was in Brite to redeem for $100 wouldn't that be 
inconsistent with the term 'as long as you desire?' 
Wouldn't that be inconsistent? 
A I'm not sure I can answer that (Brady p. 29, lines 
21-25, p. 30, lines 1-2). 
Clearly, if Mr. Brady could not resolve this inconsistency, 
this matter should have been submitted to the jury to determine the 
proper meaning of the Subject Paragraph. This is particularly the 
case because Brite's Motion for a Directed Verdict must be judged 
in the light most favorable to the party opposing the Motion. 
Klienert v. Kimball Elevator Company, 1995 WL 613775, 275 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 44, (Ut. App. 10/19/95) 
Because the Subject Paragraph is ambiguous, the principles of 
construction clearly compel submission of this matter to the jury, 
and preclude the determination of this case on a Motion for 
Directed Verdict. 
The only other legal argument of Brite regarding the 
interpretation of the ambiguous language is Brite's assertion at 
page 14 of the Brief of Appellee that "course of dealing" are 
"commercial transaction terms governed by Article II of the Uniform 
Commercial Code". Brite then states that the matter before the 
Court is not a commercial transaction and that the application of 
such concept is not appropriate. This argument is without merit. 
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Appellants acknowledge that Article II ol the* Uniform 
( . (see 
U.C.A. 70A-2-102), which this case is not an example. However, 
the portion f ^ applicable to course of dealing is 
c * . i" i Article J i: 
U.C.A. 70A-1-205(1) provides as follows: 
A course of dealing is a sequence of previous 
conduct between the parties to a particular 
transaction which is fairly to be regarded as 
establishing a common basis of understanding 
for interpreting their expressions and other 
conduct. 
Additionally, Appellants note that the concept of using the 
course of dealing between parties as a means of interpreting their 
contracts is a principle used in all aspects of the law and is not 
limited exclusively to the Uniform Commercial Code. An example of 
this is its application to contracts for services rendered, which 
contracts are without the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
The application of this principle is found the case of Eie v. 
St. Benedicts Hospital, 6 3 8 P. 2 c:i ] 3 9 0, ] :) 81 ) 
The Eie case is based upon an agreement for services between 
the hospital and individuals providing paramedic services in the 
Ogden area. At page 1195
 C)f i ts opi ni 01 1, tl: 11= Coiij : t :i nterpreted the 
services contract in 1ight of the course of dealing of the parties, 
and stated as follow: 
Finally, the course of dealing of the parties 
gives some indication of their intentions. 
Throughout the entire time the agreement was 
in force, the hospital reimbursed to plaintiff 
90% of the bill. At no time did it pay a flat 
$90 fee. Furthermore, plaintiffs made no 
protest until after the contractual 
15 
relationship was terminated in February 1977. 
Though arguably clear on its face, where the 
parties demonstrate by their actions that to 
them the contract meant something quite 
different, the intent of the parties will be 
enforced, (emphasis added) 
Based on the testimony given at trial on the three principles 
of judicial construction discussed in this section, the proper 
interpretation of the Subject Paragraph cannot be determined as a 
matter of law on a Motion for Directed Verdict. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANTS PROPERLY RAISED THE ISSUE OF 
WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 
THE ISSUES OF WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL HAVE NOT 
BEEN FIRST PRESENTED IN THIS MATTER ON APPEAL. 
Attached as Exhibit MAlf in the Addendum to this Reply Brief is 
a copy of the Appellants' Motion for a New Trial and to Amend the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which was filed with the 
trial court (R. 697-699) . This document was also attached as 
Exhibit "D" and incorporated into Appellants' trial court 
Memorandum in support of its post-trial motions (R. 726-752) . The 
fourth numbered paragraph of the Motion urges the trial court to 
amend its findings to make them complete and address the matter of 
estoppel and waiver. 
The issues of estoppel and waiver should have been submitted 
to the jury for the jurors' determination, because they were 
factual issues that could not be determined as a matter of law. 
The submission of these matters to the jury was urged by 
Appellants' counsel on the second day of the trial as counsel was 
arguing the Motion for Directed Verdict to the Court. When the 
16 
trial court asked Appellants' * - - i 
counsel interrupted the argument to confirm that estoppel had not 
been pled, Counsel for Appellants stated "that's [estoppel] 
argument to the jury." Appellants' rnunse I continued; "The 
compi sesn't have to pi ead estoppel or waiver it is not 
a deficiency at all now" (K. bA), 
Though perhaps not cti'tlulb, stated, nbumiriiil I est In JH\ of 
waiver and estoppel had been submitted to the jury, without 
objection. There is r > deficiency in pleadings when the issue has 
been presented in • • i P- •*. •-.<•.- .;: , The matte i: was pi: operly 
before the trial court and the jury, and the jury should have 
properly been instructed on these issues for their factual 
deter mi nati 01 1 • ' ' 
The case of Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432 (Ut. 
App 199J cited b;, the Appellee, is distinguishable from the 
matte • - lore tl le Appellate Court. Ii i Justheim., the case had 
not been decided on a motion for directed verdict. The case had, 
in fact, been submitted to the jury. There had been no :i nsti i :icti on 
to tl :te jit] : > , ai id i ic argument to the court or jury on the issue of 
estoppel before the matter was submitted to the jury. As stated by 
the Justheim Court, the estoppel theory was first ment ioned in the 
post -Li" i a I motion nl I lie Appellants. 
In the matter now before the Appellate Court, the issues of 
waiver and estoppel were raised in the argument on I ho Motion for 
Directed Verdict _ whi ] e the jury was waiting in the jury room 
outside of the hearing of the court. Counsel for Appellants argued 
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that the issues were to be properly submitted to the jury. These 
issues were again raised in the post-trial motions of the 
Appellants, all of which is timely before the submission of the 
case to the jury. 
Ample evidence was admitted at trial that officers of Brite 
had stated, on several occasions, that (a) only the sales 
representatives had exercised the carry-over point redemption 
provision, and (b) that this right was that of the sales 
representatives (Palmer p. 86, lines 9-15, and quoted at p. 39 of 
Appellants' original Brief; Palmer pp. 31-3 3, quoting Mike Perry 
and quoted at p. 46 of the Appellants' original Brief; Bruno Vassel 
p. 39, and quoted at p. 41 of Appellants' original Brief). 
This evidence and these admissions by its own officers 
demonstrate that Brite was estopped from denying the proper 
interpretation of the redemption provision. Brite had waived any 
position that it had that someone other than the sales 
representative could exercise the redemption provision. Whether 
the admitted testimony was totally dispositive of the issue, is 
irrelevant here. In all events, such testimony should have been 
submitted to the jury. 
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that 
"when issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings". A matter is 
tried by express or implied consent when testimony is admitted at 
18 
trial 01 1 the issues not raised I n the original pleadings, without 
objection < •;•-*• .1 ig counse,. 
In the case of Zions First National Bank v. Rocky Mountain 
Irrigation. Inc., P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme 
Court :iidaf or y for the li lal ooniiri to submit 
evidence t^ on issues presented at trial when there was a 
failure ?\ object t evidence which was outside the scope of the 
f, till HE Coiii: t stated: 
Our rules of civil procedure require that the 
pleadings be conformed to the evidence 
presented at trial when no objection is made 
to the introduction of such evidence. Utah 
R.Civ.P 15(b); see Poulsen v. Poulsen, 672 
P.2d 97 (Utah 1983) (mandatory for trial court 
to gr^nt leave to amend to conform,, to 
evidence); General Ins. Co. V. Carniecero 
Dynasty Corp., 545 P. 2d 502, 505-06 (Utah 
1976) (failure to object to evidence outside 
scope of pleadings is implied consent to try 
issue raised by such evidence) . The trial 
court has no discretion to deny such an 
amendment. General Ins. Co., 545 P. 2d at 506. 
By not giving the proposed instructions on 
common law fraud and attempted theft by 
deception, the trial court failed to comply 
with Rule 15(b). Furthermore, our case law 
requires that the trial court instruct the 
jury on each party's theory of the case so 
long a£ it is supported by competent evidence, 
(citations omitted, emphasis is that of the 
Supreme Court) 
It should b£ further noted that there is no requirement that 
a party make a itiotion to amend Its pleadi nqs to conform, hi the 
evidence 'he express or implied consent to the consideration of 
an issue is sufficient for the presentation of the matter to a 
jury# or for the issue to be the basi s « :)f a judgmei i, t: entered i i :i„ a 
matter. 
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In the case of Eie v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 
1194 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court, citing other Utah 
authorities, stated that Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure: 
Further allows for an amendment to conform to 
the proof after trail or even after judgment, 
and indicates that if the ends of justice so 
require, 'failure so to amend does not affect 
the result of the trial of these issues.' 
This idea is confirmed by Rule 54(c)(1), 
U.R.C.P.: '[E]very final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor 
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings.' 
In the Zions Bank case supra, the Supreme Court held that the 
trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the issues 
admitted pursuant to the testimony presented at trial. In the 
matter now before the Appellate Court, the trial court erred in 
failing to submit the case to the jury based upon the issues of 
waiver and estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
If the Appeals Court determines that the Subject Paragraph is 
ambiguous, then this matter should be remanded to the trial court 
for submission to a jury with proper instruction to construe the 
Subject Paragraph in accordance with the principles of construction 
of ambiguous documents. In such event, the jury should rightfully 
determine the factual issues bearing on the construction of the 
agreement of the parties. 
Further, if this Court, in de novo consideration of this 
matter, agrees that the issue of waiver and estoppel were properly 
20 
raised and argued to the trial court then, under the standard set 
forth in the Kleinert case, supra. there is clearly sufficient 
testimony of waiver and estoppel that would preclude the granting 
of a Motion for Directed Verdict by the trial court• In such 
event, the jury should rightfully determine the factual issues 
relating to waiver and estoppel, and this matter should be remanded 
for their consideration. 
If this Court determines, however, that the Subject Paragraph 
is unambiguous, then the Appeals Court should analyze de novo, the 
Subject Paragraph and interpret the redemption provision in light 
of the principles of contract construction established by this 
Court. These principles provide that a contract should be 
interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its 
terms. Based upon the argument set forth in Point I of this Reply 
Brief, Appellants submit that the answer to the question; "Who can 
redeem the carry-over points?" is that only the sales 
representatives have this redemption right. 
If the Appeals Court determines, as matter of law, that only 
the sales representatives can exercise the carry-over point 
redemption provision, then the trial court erred, and this matter 
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions that only 
Weaver and Palmer are able to exercise the redemption provision. 
Then the balance of the case, relating to the breach of the 
21 
contract by Brite and the damages suffered by the Appellants, 
should be submitted to the jury. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this xlU"V day of February, 1996. £
i 
JRUCE L. DIBB 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, 
DIBB & JACKSON 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
Reply of Appellants and attached Addendum to the counsel for the 
Appellee by placing true copies thereof in an envelope addressed 
to: 
Rick J. Sutherland 
P.O. Box 770 
Park City, Utah 84060 
postage prepaid, this Qvk^K day of February, 1 9 9 6 . 
RPLBRF.436 
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. -ISTTSCT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JULIE WEAVER and 
CATHERINE PALMER 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BRITE MUSIC ENTERPRISES, INC., 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
AND TO AMEND THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 91093124CN 
Judge Iwasaki 
Pursuant to Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, New trials; 
amendments of Judgment, and more particularly pursuant to (a) Grounds, (6) and (7), 
the Plaintiffs, Julie Weaver and Catherine Palmer, move the Court to amend the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment entered on or about January 27, 
1995, and direct the entry of a new judgment as fol lows: 
1. That the Plaintiffs, Julie Weaver and Catherine Palmer, entered into 
a Sales Agreement wi th Defendant, Brite Music, Exhibit D7, in the years 1982 and 
1983, which was drafted and prepared by Defendant, and provides for additional 
compensation to Plaintiffs in the form of carry-over points. The following language 
of the Brite Sales Agreement provided as fol lows: 
- K, \s \s i) * 
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" As you continue to exceed 1200 points per month, the increasing 
carry-over points may accumulate for as long as you desire; however, 
each increment of 5,000 carry-over points is redeemable for a check 
from Brite for $100. Redeeming points in this manner does not affect 
your life-time point accumulation or the benefits you may eventually 
derive therefrom." 
2. The Court finds as a matter of law that the said language in the 
sales agreement was clear and unambiguous, and gave the right to Brite Music 
Enterprises, Inc., the Defendant, to redeem from Plaintiffs for $ 100 each 5,000 carry-
over points. 
3. The Court finds as a matter of law that the language in the sales 
agreement is clearly ambiguous and that a proper finding of fact should be made by 
the jury as to the meaning of the ambiguous term by the jury making a determination 
by the representations of the Defendant's agents, the intent of the parties and such 
other and further evidence that will be necessary to give meaning to the terms of the 
agreement. 
4% That at no time, as a matter of law, did the Defendant, Brite Music, 
by and through its agents, waive, alter, amend or make an independent agreement, 
or is Defendant estopped from denying, by its actions or its conduct, that the Plaintiffs 
had the sole right to exercise the redemption option. 
Pursuant to the above-entitled matter, the Plaintiffs have ordered a 
transcript of the trial and therefore, respectfully request the Court to allow sufficient 
time for the court reporter to transcribe and testimony and then Plaintiffs wil l file a 
Memorandum in support of the Motion to amend the judgment within ten days after 
-3-
the transcript is furnished in the above matter. 
Dated this ^3 day of February, 1995. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
<rf^?<r?/*4-S A j > ^ 4 
JFhohnas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion to the 
following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Rick J. Sutherland 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 770 
Park City, Utah 84060 
postage prepaid, this —S day of February, 1995. 
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Jorge CRUZ, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Norberto MOLINA, Defendant. 
Civ. No. 89-432 (PG). 
United States District Court, 
D. Puerto Rico. 
March 27, 1992. 
Tenant brought suit seeking damages for 
landlord's breach of lease agreement and 
negligence with regard to tenant's belongings. 
Landlord counterclaimed seeking recovery for 
breach of contract, damages to property, 
attorney fees and slander. The District Court, 
Gene Carter, Chief Judge, sitting by 
designation, held that: (1) tenant sustained no 
damage from being excluded from the 
leasehold; (2) tenant was not entitled to 
reimbursement for money spent prior to 
execution of lease on alterations to house; (3) 
even if landlord was negligent in his care of 
tenant's belongings on the property, tenant 
failed to prove damages; (4) tenant was not 
entitled to damages for severe mental anguish 
allegedly suffered when landlord locked him 
out; (5) tenant was obligated to continue 
paying rent until landlord excluded him from 
the property; (6) tenant was responsible for 
extermination expenses; and (7) landlord was 
not entitled to damages for mental anguish 
and emotional distress caused by tenant's 
lawsuit and destruction of landlord's property. 
Ordered accordingly. 
[1] LANDLORD AND TENANT <S=* 94(6) 
233k94(6) 
Although notice had been given that tenant 
planned to leave the premises at some 
indeterminate time after Christmas, lease had 
not terminated under Puerto Rico law, where 
landlord had asked tenant to inform him 
before tenant left the property and no such 
notification was given, and although tenant 
was in the process of moving out, he had not 
moved out. 
[2] LANDLORD AND TENANT <®^  110(1) 
233kll(Kl) 
Under Puerto Rico law, abandonment of 
leasehold requires both act and intention of 
relinquishing premises absolutely. 
[3] LANDLORD AND TENANT <&* 130(2) 
233kl30(2) 
By locking tenant out of the leasehold, 
landlord breached both his obligation under 
Puerto Rico law to maintain tenant in 
peaceful enjoyment of leasehold and his 
obligation not to deprive tenant of leasehold 
without assistance of law, but tenant 
sustained no damages where he was in the 
process of moving out. 
[3] LANDLORD AND TENANT <S=> 130(4) 
233kl30(4) 
By locking tenant out of the leasehold, 
landlord breached both his obligation under 
Puerto Rico law to maintain tenant in 
peaceful eiyoyment of leasehold and his 
obligation not to deprive tenant of leasehold 
without assistance of law, but tenant 
sustained no damages where he was in the 
process of moving out. 
[3] LANDLORD AND TENANT <S=* 275 
233k275 
By locking tenant out of the leasehold, 
landlord breached both his obligation under 
Puerto Rico law to maintain tenant in 
peaceful enjoyment of leasehold and his 
obligation not to deprive tenant of leasehold 
without assistance of law, but tenant 
sustained no damages where he was in the 
process of moving out. 
[4] LANDLORD AND TENANT <£=> 152(11) 
233kl52(ll) 
Under Puerto Rico law, tenant was not 
entitled to reimbursement for money spent on 
alterations to house prior to execution of lease, 
absent adequate proof of how much tenant 
spent on repairs. 
[5] LANDLORD AND TENANT <S^ 161(3) 
233kl61(3) 
Even if landlord was negligent, under Puerto 
Rico law, in his care of tenant's belongings on 
the property, tenant failed to prove damages. 
[6] DAMAGES <S=> 49.10 
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115k49.10 
Under Puerto Rico law, tenant was not 
entitled to damages for severe mental anguish 
allegedly suffered when landlord locked him 
out of the property, absent showing that 
tenant's health, welfare and happiness were 
affected in an appreciable manner. 
[7] LANDLORD AND TENANT <&* 190(1) 
233kl90(l) 
Under Puerto Rico law, tenant was obligated 
to continue paying rent until landlord 
excluded him from the property. 31 L.P.R.A. 
§ 4052. 
[8] LANDLORD AND TENANT <®^  55(1) 
233k55(l) 
Under Puerto Rico law, tenant was liable for 
extermination expenses incurred by landlord 
due to infestation caused by tenant leaving 
the house dirty. 31 L.P.R.A. § 4060. 
[9] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 
<§=> 2742.5 
170Ak2742.5 
Issue of whether landlord was entitled to 
attorney fees under clause in contract 
requiring tenant to pay reasonable expenses 
arising out of legal action due to breach of 
contract was waived, where landlord presented 
no evidence on this claim and had not 
addressed it in his brief. 
[10] DAMAGES <S=* 49.10 
115k49.10 
Landlord did not make showing of mental 
distress caused by tenant's lawsuit and 
destruction of landlord's property adequate to 
require compensation in damages under 
Puerto Rico law. 
[10] DAMAGES &* 55 
115k55 
Landlord did not make showing of mental 
distress caused by tenant's lawsuit and 
destruction of landlord's property adequate to 
require compensation in damages under 
Puerto Rico law. 
[11] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE <S=* 2011 
170Ak2011 
Counterclaim for slander was waived, where 
defendant presented no evidence or argument 
on such counterclaim. 
•123 Raul Barrera Morales, Santurce, P.R., 
for plaintiff. 
Ivan Duarte Sierra, Aida Tolentino Medina, 
Bayamon, PR., for defendant. 
OPINION 
GENE CARTER, Chief Judge. [FN1] 
FNl. District of Maine, sitting by designation in the 
District of Puerto Rico. 
In this diversity action brought under 
Puerto Rican law, Plaintiff seeks recovery for 
damages allegedly caused by Defendant's 
breach of a lease agreement and by 
Defendant's negligence with regard to 
Plaintiffs belongings. Defendant has 
counterclaimed seeking recovery for breach of 
contract, damage to the property, attorney's 
fees, and slander. Both parties have claimed 
damages for mental distress. The Court 
conducted a bench trial on February 3-5, 1992. 
The Court finds the following facts. 
On October 8, 1987, Plaintiff and Defendant 
entered into a lease agreement under which 
Plaintiff would rent Defendant's house in the 
Canovanillas ward of Carolina. Defendant 
was a resident of New York. The lease 
agreement was evidenced in part by a written 
document submitted in evidence as Jt.Ex. I. It 
is clear from all the testimony, [FN2] however, 
that other oral terms were agreed to by the 
parties. 
FN2. Under Puerto Rican law, "[i]f the terms of a 
contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the 
intentions of the contracting parties, the literal sense 
of its stipulations shall be observed. If the words 
should appear contrary to the evident intention of 
the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail." 
31 L.P.R.A. § 3471. The document here does not 
indicate that it contains all the terms of the 
agreement, and the testimony of both parties makes 
clear that there were other terms included in the 
agreement. 
Copr. e West 1996 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works 
WESTLAW 
788 F.Supp. 122 
(Cite as: 788 F.Supp. 122, *123) 
Under the contract Plaintiff agreed to pay 
Defendant $150 dollars a month for the term 
of the lease, which was to end on June 30, 
1988. The rent was payable in advance 
monthly, beginning on October 15,1987. Bills 
for electricity, water, minor repairs and 
maintenance of the property were to be paid 
by Plaintiff, the lessee. Plaintiff also was 
charged with taking care of the property with 
the necessary zeal and with responsibility for 
damage to the property due to his negligence. 
For violation of the terms of the lease by 
Plaintiff, Defendant, the lessor, could 
terminate the lease and demand vacation of 
the premises and compensation for damages, 
all pursuant to law. Jt.Ex. I. 
The lease contains an ambiguous phrase 
concerning termination before its expiration 
date. [FN3] The parties' testimony and the 
•124 documents in evidence make clear that 
the parties intended that the lessee, Plaintiff, 
be able to terminate in advance of the lease's 
expiration date. Jt.Exs. HI and IV; see also 
infra. The most important oral term agreed 
upon by the parties was that one of the 
bedrooms of the house would be available to 
Defendant for his use when he came to Puerto 
Rico from New York. 
FN3. Paragraph J of the Spanish version of the 
lease mistakenly states that the "arrendadora" must 
notify the "arrendadora" one month in advance if he 
wishes to terminate the lease before its expiration 
date. Although the official translation translates the 
first "arrendadora" in paragraph J as lessor and the 
second as lessee, a different term "arrendataria" or 
"arrendatario" has been used on all other occasions 
in the lease to designate the lessee. The Court 
finds, therefore, that the translation is in error. The 
clause is ambiguous because it is unclear who has 
the right to terminate upon advance notice. 
Plaintiff entered the leasehold in October 
I§87. He paid Defendant $300, which 
comprised the first month's rent and a security 
deposit. Prior to his taking possession, certain 
alterations and repairs had been made to the 
house. Among other things three small 
bedrooms had been reconfigured to make two 
larger bedrooms with closets, and washbasins 
and a medicine cabinet were added. Plaintiff 
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testified that he paid about $1000 for 
materials for this work. Defendant admits 
that Plaintiff paid for some materials, 
estimating the cost to Plaintiff at $48. 
Defendant testified that he did not know if 
certain doors used belonged to Plaintiff. The 
Court finds that although Plaintiff incurred 
some indeterminate expense for materials 
used to renovate the house before the lease 
took effect, it seems unlikely that Plaintiff 
would have incurred expenses of $1000 for a 
leasehold which, when it came into existence, 
was for less than a year. There is no evidence 
of any agreement between the parties or 
promise by the Defendant to the effect that he 
would pay for such repairs. 
In November, 1987 Plaintiff submitted 
notice by letter that he intended to begin 
looking for another place to live "after the 
Christmas holidays." Jt.Ex. IH. He testified 
that the letter was intended to comply with 
the requirement of notifying Defendant. Id. 
Defendant's letter in response, Jt.Ex. IV, 
dated November 1987, shows that he joined in 
Plaintiffs interpretation. Rather than 
complaining that Plaintiff was trying to 
terminate illegally, Defendant asked Plaintiff 
in a postscript to the letter to please inform 
Defendant "before you leave the property." 
Id. Defendant never heard from Plaintiff that 
he was leaving the property. 
Defendant returned to Puerto Rico early on 
the morning of January 27, 1988 to check on 
his property. He tried to gain admittance to 
his house then and again at 7 a.m. without 
success. Finally, at around 5 p.m. he obtained 
the key to the gate from neighbor David 
Loperena. Defendant spent a short time in 
the house, and then left to stay with friends, 
having changed the padlock on the gate to the 
fence which surrounds the property. Although 
Defendant testified that he did not change the 
padlock until February 28, when he left for 
New York, the Court does not believe him on 
this point. 
Plaintiff testified quite credibly that he 
arrived at the house in the early evening of 
January 27 and could not open the gate. The 
Court credits this testimony because it is 
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corroborated by the testimony of another 
witness, David Loperena, [FN4] and by a 
complaint filed in court by Plaintiff. PX 6. 
David Loperena testified that Defendant said 
he was going to change the locks to keep 
Plaintiff from getting the rest of his things out 
because Plaintiff had to answer to him for not 
paying the electric bill. Plaintiff later came to 
Loperena's house saying he had been locked 
out. Although Loperena admitted he had been 
drinking when Defendant came to his house to 
get the key, the Court found his memory of 
the events to be credible and detailed. On 
February 23, 1988 prior to the date on which 
Defendant admits changing the locks on the 
house and going back to New York, Plaintiff 
also filed a complaint in the Municipal Court 
in Carolina in which he recited that he had 
found himself locked out of his house. 
FN4. Plaintiffs testimony was also corroborated by 
that of Edwin Castro who was engaged to help 
Plaintiff move. 
When Defendant entered the house on 
January 27th, he found that Plaintiff had 
•125 removed some of his furniture, but that 
there remained some furniture, clothing, 
books, personal effects, and boxes of kitchen 
utensils and food belonging to Plaintiff. The 
furniture remaining included a locked file 
cabinet, a dresser, a sofa, and a table and 
chairs. Defendant testified that the house was 
in shocking condition, that the dining room 
table was covered with dust, garbage was 
lying around, grapes were lying out on a table, 
the stove was filthy and in deplorable 
condition, window cranks were broken, the 
lawn was rutted, and there were rats. 
Defendant testified that from the condition 
of the house, he thought Plaintiff had 
abandoned it. The Court finds that that 
conclusion was unwarranted. Many of 
Plaintiffs belongings and furniture were still 
in the house. Although David Loperena's 
mother told Defendant she had not seen 
Plaintiff for a few days, Loperena testified 
that he told Defendant that Plaintiff was in 
the process of moving out and to let him go. 
[FN5] Although Plaintiff testified that he was 
still living in the house at the time Defendant 
jrtOH)/^ C o p r . e West 1996 No claim 
returned, the Court finds that he was not 
occupying the premises, but was in the process 
of moving out. 
FN5. There was a conflict between the testimony of 
Defendant and David Loperena. Defendant testified 
that he did not speak to Loperena because Loperena 
was drunk. Witness Rodolfo Ortiz, who went with 
Defendant to Loperena's house, testified that he 
does not recall if the two talked. Loperena admitted 
he had been drinking when Defendant arrived to get 
the key, but described in detail a conversation they 
had had concerning, among other things, 
nonpayment of the electric bill for Defendant's 
house. Because Defendant and Loperena had 
dealings concerning Defendant's truck, about which 
Defendant testified that he was very angry, the 
Court finds it highly improbable that Defendant did 
not speak to Loperena when he went to his house to 
get the key after being in New York for several 
months. The Court also found Loperena's version 
of the conversation convincing because of the detail 
provided and because it seems to make sense in the 
context of what was then otherwise occurring. 
Defendant testified that he spent about 
$1000 putting the house back in order. He 
states that he spent $300 to replace the stove, 
$100 to replace the window cranks, about $700 
for extermination services, and some money 
for reseeding the grass. Photographs which 
purportedly document the condition of the 
house prior to Plaintiff's tenancy and as 
Defendant found it in January 1988 were 
admitted as DX 40-92. Plaintiff testified that 
the photos represented as showing the house 
before he moved in also show it as he left it 
and that the photos showing slovenly 
housekeeping and disarray do not represent 
the house as he left it. He testified that he 
never used the stove. 
Defendant's testimony that the house was 
messy and dirty on January 27 had the ring of 
truth and was corroborated by the fact that 
David Loperena testified that Defendant 
wanted him to see the bad condition of the 
house. The Court believes Defendant's 
testimony that the house had become infested 
with roaches and rodents, requiring the 
ministrations of an exterminator. Since the 
house was in the possession of Plaintiff until 
to orig. U.S. govt, works 
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Defendant arrived, the Court finds that 
condition of the house was due to Plaintiffs 
lack of care for it. The Court does not believe 
that the photographs all represent the 
condition of the house as Defendant found it, 
however. For example, Defendant testified 
that the photographs numbered 46, 47, 83, and 
92 all show what he saw when he got to the 
house. That is impossible since the stove is 
pictured in the kitchen in two of the 
photographs, DX 83 and 92, and outside on the 
porch in another. DX 47. Clearly, someone 
had moved the stove before some of the 
pictures were taken. This lends some credence 
to Plaintiffs testimony that the house as 
depicted in the photographs was not as he had 
left it. 
After Plaintiff found that he could not get 
into the house on January 27, he did not 
return again to ask Defendant to let him 
remove his belongings but rather sought to 
initiate legal proceedings to gain admittance. 
Defendant remained in the house throughout 
most of February without hearing from 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that he was afraid 
of Defendant because Defendant had 
threatened to pay to have Plaintiff's head 
ripped off. David Loperena testified that the 
threats were made in *126 his presence. 
Defendant denies having made the threats. 
On the 24th of February Plaintiff saw 
Defendant at a local store and Defendant told 
him he should remove his belongings from the 
house by 6 p.m. that evening. Plaintiff did not 
do so and persisted with his legal proceedings. 
He testified that he did not want to go to the 
house alone and that he had sought police 
accompaniment, but that by the time he 
arrived Defendant had left. 
Plaintiff's attorney prepared an application 
for a possessory injunction, but Plaintiff 
decided not to file it because he did not want 
to move into the house again. Plaintiff 
continued his other legal proceedings to 
retrieve his belongings, and Defendant 
returned to Puerto Rico at the end of March in 
response to a summons. Plaintiff and 
Defendant met with a judge on April 8 and 
arranged for Plaintiff to enter the house and 
get his remaining property. On April 15, 
Plaintiff, his attorney, Castro, Defendant and 
a few others met at the house. They entered 
the house [FN6], Plaintiff and Defendant each 
identified his property, and the attorney 
detailed the contents of the house in a notarial 
act. Jt.Ex. II. Plaintiff's clothing was found 
in Defendant's bedroom, and Defendant's 
clothing was found in Plaintiffs room. 
Plaintiff stated that a twelve carat emerald, 
$2500 to $3000 in cash, and "two pieces of 
steel, eight feet long with their base" were 
missing. He seeks recovery here for the 
emerald and the cash. 
FN 6. Plaintiff opened the gate and the house with 
his keys. Although Plaintiff was able to enter in 
April, the Court does not find that he was equally 
able to enter the house on January 27. The locks 
were padlocks and easily changeable, and the Court 
finds that while on January 27 Defendant had put in 
place on the gate a padlock which Plaintiff could 
not open, he had at some time before the April 15 
meeting of the parties and counsel on the premises 
switched padlocks so Plaintiff could enter. 
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met 
his burden of showing he left either an 
emerald or any significant amount of cash in 
the house. Plaintiff testified that he had left a 
12 carat emerald, valued at $65,000, in the 
pocket of his tuxedo in the closet of the house 
he rented from Defendant. The only 
corroborating evidence was provided by 
Plaintiff's attorney, Wilfredo Hcorelli, who 
testified that at his initial interview with 
Plaintiff, Plaintiff told him he could not get 
into the house and he had left clothing and 
some jewelry there, including an emerald. 
Picorelli's notes of that meeting refer to 
valuables and money, but not specifically to 
an emerald. Ex. K. 
Plaintiff may, at one time, have possessed 
an emerald. A photograph of what could be 
either an emerald or green glass was admitted 
as an exhibit. Plaintiff also told an engaging 
tale of how he had acquired the stone in the 
photograph from a friend for whose hotel he 
had provided free laundry service over a 
period of years. Plaintiff further testified that 
the emerald had been photographed for him 
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by a photographer who usually documented 
hair transplants. Even if the Court believed 
that Plaintiff had an emerald and that it is 
represented in the photograph, those facts 
merely show that he had an emerald in 1980 
or 1981. The record is notably devoid of any 
evidence, other than Plaintiffs testimony, 
showing that Plaintiff had an emerald in his 
possession around the time he says it was lost. 
While Plaintiff testified that he usually left 
the emerald in his daughter's care and that he 
had retrieved it from her possession to show to 
David Loperena's mother, neither the 
daughter nor Mrs. Loperena testified. In fact, 
no one testified who had ever seen an emerald 
in Plaintiff's possession This leads the Court 
to believe that no one could testify to having 
seen Plaintiff with an emerald around the 
pertinent time. There was no evidence of any 
insurance held for such a valuable item. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs other behavior was also 
not consonant with that of someone who is 
concerned about a very valuable possession. 
After Plaintiff gained access to the house and 
asserted that the emerald and a large amount 
of cash were missing, he did not report them 
to the police as stolen items. Given the 
asserted value of the emerald and the money, 
it seems unlikely *127 that an owner would 
have left them in the pocket of his tuxedo. 
Moreover, the tuxedo seems an unlikely 
storage place when Plaintiff had a locked file 
cabinet on the premises. 
Plaintiff also made only desultory attempts 
to get whatever property might be in the 
house. After the first rebuff at the locked 
gate, he did not attempt to go to the house for 
the whole month of February while Defendant 
was in Puerto Rico. Rather, Plaintiff seemed 
perfectly willing to let the court proceedings 
he had initiated run their course. Although 
he professed to be worried about alleged 
threats made by Defendant against him, the 
Court does not believe Plaintiffs testimony 
that fear kept him from more actively seeking 
the return of his property. It is conceivable 
that Defendant used idle threatening 
language in his anger about the condition of 
the house; however, the Court does not 
believe either from Plaintiffs demeanor and 
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expression during his testimony or from his 
conduct that Plaintiff interpreted Defendant's 
words as serious threats. As both an attorney 
and a mature man, Plaintiff would have 
construed Defendant's angry language as the 
posturing that it was. 
Conclusions of Law 
A. Plaintiffs Claims 
The Court finds that on January 27, 1988, 
when Defendant returned to Canovanillas 
from New York, the lease between him and 
Plaintiff was still in effect. Although the 
lease provided for thirty-day advance notice of 
termination, that clause is ambiguous, as 
described above, and can be interpreted with 
the aid of extrinsic evidence. The evidence 
here shows that the parties intended that the 
lessee should give at least 30 days notice to 
lessor before terminating the lease. As 
discussed above Plaintiff and Defendant both 
interpreted the clause as allowing Plaintiff to 
terminate early, and both Plaintiffs notice 
letter and Defendant's response to the notice 
indicate that neither party considered the 
lease to be terminated thirty days from the 
date of the notice. [FN7] 
FN7. In his brief Defendant appears to argue two 
conflicting positions. First, he argues that the 
termination became effective on December 15, 
1987, thirty days after Plaintiffs notice was sent. 
This is clearly not what was intended by the parties 
since Plaintiff said he planned to begin looking 
"after the Christmas holidays," and Defendant by 
return letter acknowledged the notification. 
Defendant also argues that the termination must 
have occurred on December 31, 1987 because 
every reasonable person knows that Christmas is 
over on December 31. Again, this is not persuasive 
since Plaintiffs letter said he would begin looking 
for a new place after the holidays. Defendant 
clearly accepted the indefinite nature of this, asking 
to be informed with more specificity before Plaintiff 
actually surrendered possession. Moreover, 
Defendant asked Plaintiff to "discontinue" 
discounting his rent payment, which strongly 
indicates that Defendant expected Plaintiff to remain 
in the house, thus requiring more rent payments. 
[1] Although notice had been given that 
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Plaintiff planned to leave the leased premises 
at some indeterminate time after Christmas, 
the Court concludes for two reasons that the 
lease had not terminated. First, Defendant 
had asked Plaintiff to inform him before 
Plaintiff left the property and no such 
notification was given, indicating that 
Plaintiff, who appeared punctilious about such 
matters, given the tone of the first notification 
letter, was not yet ready to surrender 
possession. Second, although Plaintiff was 
apparently in the process of moving out on 
January 27, he had not moved out. 
[2] Although neither party has cited any 
Puerto Rican law of abandonment, the Court 
is satisfied that abandonment of a leasehold in 
Puerto Rico, as elsewhere, requires both the 
act and intention of relinquishing the 
premises absolutely. Black's Law Dictionary 
(5th ed.), at 2. Plaintiffs and David 
Loperena's testimony and the presence of a 
significant quantity of Plaintiffs belongings 
in the house make clear that on January 27 
Plaintiff had not abandoned the leased 
premises, for he had not intended at that point 
to relinquish the premises absolutely. 
Defendant had an obligation under the 
Puerto Rican Civil Code "to maintain the 
lessee in the peaceful enjoyment of the lease 
during all the time of the contract." 31 
L.P.R.A. § 4051. If Defendant believed *128 
that Plaintiff had breached the lease, had not 
paid the rent or was not taking care of the 
property, he had legal recourse. Article 1459 
of the Puerto Rican Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 
4066, provides a forcible entry and detainer 
action by which Defendant could have sought 
to oust Plaintiff. Article 370 of the Civil Code, 
31 L.P.R.A. § 1444, also states specifically 
that "[i]n no case can possession be forcibly 
acquired so long as a possessor is opposed 
thereto. Any person who believes that he has 
aflight or action to deprive another of the 
holding of a thing, shall petition the 
assistance of the competent authorities, 
provided the holder refuses to deliver up the 
said thing." 
[3] By locking Plaintiff out of the leasehold 
on January 27, Defendant breached both his 
obligation to maintain Plaintiff in the 
peaceful enjoyment of the leasehold and his 
obligation not to deprive Plaintiff of the 
leasehold without the assistance of law. 
Defendant is thus responsible to Plaintiff for 
any harm caused to him by the disturbance. 
Goenaga v. West Indies Trading Corp., 88 
P.R.R. 847 (1963). 
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not 
adequately proved that he sustained any 
damages when he was excluded from the 
leasehold by Defendant. Although Plaintiff 
testified that he was still living at the 
Canovanillas house when Defendant changed 
the lock, the Court disbelieves that testimony. 
When Defendant arrived, a close neighbor, 
Mrs. Loperena, told him that she had not seen 
Plaintiff for a few days. His bed was no longer 
on the premises. Moreover, Defendant 
testified convincingly that he had gone to the 
house in the middle of the night and in the 
early morning of January 27th, finding 
Plaintiffs car gone both times and being 
unable to rouse anyone on the premises. The 
Court finds it more likely than not, therefore, 
that Plaintiff was, as David Loperena testified 
he told Defendant, in the process of moving 
out and that he was not staying in the house. 
Although Plaintiff was wrongfully excluded 
from the property while the leasehold was still 
in effect, the Court cannot find that he 
incurred the damages he claims for having to 
find a more expensive furnished apartment 
quickly and for extra expenses for himself and 
his son due to the distance of the new lodgings 
from their activities. Clearly, Plaintiff had 
been planning to move out since November. 
Plaintiff also testified that if Defendant had 
waited a few more days, Plaintiff would have 
been out. These facts, coupled with the fact 
that Plaintiff was apparently moving and not 
still staying in the house, lead the Court to 
believe that Plaintiff had made prior 
arrangements, contrary to his testimony. 
Again, Plaintiff failed to provide corroborative 
evidence which might have made his claim 
more credible. Plaintiff has not submitted 
evidence from which the Court might 
determine damages caused by Plaintiffs loss 
of use of the property he had left in the house 
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between the date he was locked out in 
January 1988 and the date on which he was 
able to reclaim the property in April 1988. 
[43 As discussed above, although Plaintiff 
has made claims to be reimbursed for money 
he spent on alterations to Defendant's house 
the Court finds no clear agreement under 
which Defendant is obligated to pay. Clearly, 
since the expenditures occurred prior to 
execution of the written lease, that document 
cannot provide the basis for Defendant's 
obligation to pay. Plaintiff testified that there 
were verbal agreements between Defendant 
and David Loperena and Norberto Rohena and 
himself concerning the repairs to be made to 
Defendant's house, but the Court has not 
heard testimony concerning the nature of all 
of these agreements. Plaintiff testified that 
the repairs on Defendant's house were to be 
performed by Rohena in return for money 
Rohena owed Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not 
testified to any undertaking by Defendant to 
pay for the expenses incurred by Plaintiff. 
"Unless damages actually exist and are 
sufficiently proved, there can be no 
compensation, since Puerto Rico law does not 
sanction punitive damages." Riofrio Anda v. 
Ralston Purina Co., 772 F.Supp. 46, 52 
(D.P.R.1991). Even if Defendant in *129 this 
case were voider some duty to pay Plaintiff for 
his expenditures, Plaintiff has not submitted 
adequate proof of how much he spent on the 
repairs. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that he 
spent close to or over $1000 for a medicine 
cabinet and materials purchased by David 
Loperena for the repairs. There was no 
breakdown of the expenditures provided. 
David Loperena testified, however, that 
Plaintiff paid $1500 for the improvements, 
again with no itemization of the costs. 
Defendant testified that Plaintiff might have 
paid $48 for certain lumber for the project. On 
this record, the Court could Hot reach any 
determination of Plaintiffs out of pocket 
expenses. 
[5] Plaintiff has further alleged that 
Defendant was negligent in his care of 
Plaintiffs belongings on the property, and he 
claims damages for the loss, through this 
alleged negligence, of the emerald and $2500 
or $3000 in cash. As discussed above, Plaintiff 
has not met his burden of showing that he had 
an emerald and a large amount of cash on the 
premises when Defendant locked him out. 
Therefore, even if Defendant had been shown 
to be negligent, which he has not, Plaintiff has 
not proven the damages which he seeks. 
[6] Finally, Plaintiff claims that he has 
suffered severe mental anguish because 
Defendant locked him out of the rented 
property. As the Court said in Riofrio Anda v. 
Ralston Purina Co., 772 F.Supp. at 53: 
"Although Puerto Rico recognizes moral 
damages for breach of contract, ... moral 
damages for emotional distress will not be 
awarded unless evidence establishes that the 
mental condition of the claimant has been 
considerably affected." As the court also 
noted, even under the more liberal standard 
for awarding such damages under Puerto 
Rican tort law, there must still be "a showing 
that in 'some appreciable measure the health, 
welfare and happiness of the claimant were 
really affected.' " The Court finds that the 
proof here does not meet either standard. 
Plaintiff testified that finding himself locked 
out of his house, he was terribly anguished 
and in a state of nerves, and his blood pressure 
became and remained high. The Court does 
not accept Plaintiffs uncorroborated 
testimony as proving 1) that his blood pressure 
increased at the time of the lockout, and 2) 
that the increase was caused by Defendant's 
conduct. Plaintiff is not a physician, and he 
did not testify to having visited a physician. If 
Plaintiff's statement was intended not to 
prove medical fact but to be merely 
colloquially descriptive of his state of distress, 
the Court did not find it very persuasive. The 
testimony was delivered in a perfunctory 
manner and the Court was not left with the 
belief that Plaintiff had been considerably 
affected. The Court has found that Plaintiff 
was not staying in the house at the time he 
found himself locked out and that he had left 
his belongings there until he could move 
them. Thus, being locked out merely 
continued a situation which Plaintiff had 
begun and was not likely to have caused 
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terrible anguish. David Loperena testified 
that Plaintiff was very worried because all of 
his property was in the house. Plaintiff, 
however, immediately acted on his worry by 
instituting legal proceedings, which seemed 
likely to get his belongings back shortly. 
Other testimony, by Plaintiff and Edwin 
Castro [FN8], indicated that Plaintiff was in 
mental distress because of the alleged threats 
by Defendant. As previously stated, the Court 
finds that Plaintiff was not as distressed by 
the threats as he has testified. On the basis of 
the record before it, the Court finds that 
Defendant did interfere with Plaintiffs 
peaceful enjoyment of *130 his leasehold and 
that Plaintiff did suffer some slight mental 
anguish because of being prevented from 
entering his house. The Court does not find, 
however, that this mental distress was 
significant enough to warrant an award of 
damages. 
FN8. Edwin Castro's testimony was not particularly 
credible in its entirety because he seemed to be 
reciting events by rote without having a real 
memory of them. His memory of dates of certain 
events does not coincide with that of any of the 
other witnesses, and when he was pressed his story 
became much more confused. In any event, Castro 
testified that as he and Plaintiff were driving, they 
were flagged down by Defendant and Plaintiff did 
not want to stop because he was fearful. Plaintiff 
did stop, however, and engage in conversation with 
Defendant, leading the Court to believe that even if 
Castro were telling the truth about Plaintiffs state 
of mind, Plaintiff was not so fearful that his anxiety 
affected him in any considerable manner. 
B. Counterclaims 
Defendant has filed a counterclaim in this 
suit seeking payment of rent. The record 
shows clearly that Plaintiff paid $300 at the 
inception of the lease for the first month's rent 
and a security deposit. Plaintiff also sent 
Defendant a check for $125 for the second 
month's rent, representing the second monthly 
payment minus $25 for cutting the grass. 
Defendant informed Plaintiff that he should 
"discontinue" this reduction in the rent, 
because he does "not agree with that 
discount." The Court finds that Defendant by 
the terms of his reply letter accepted the 
reduced payment for the second monthly 
payment, but indicated that he did not agree 
to it for future payments. The Court bases 
this finding both on Defendant's use of the 
word "discontinue" and on his failure to 
request that Plaintiff pay him the deducted 
$25. The Court finds, therefore, that taking 
into account the security deposit, Defendant 
had received the equivalent of three months 
rent, which would have covered Plaintiffs 
occupancy through mid-January. [FN9] 
FN9. Plaintiff testified that in October he loaned 
Defendant another $300 to buy airline tickets to 
New York and that Defendant said to deduct that 
amount from the rent. David Loperena also 
testified to the loan, but he placed the date in 
February. The Court does not believe that such a 
loan and agreement took place. First, if Plaintiff 
had made such a loan in October, to be credited to 
rent, he would have been unlikely then to have 
remitted the November rent for it would have been 
paid by the credit. The Court does not believe that 
the loan occurred in February because Plaintiff and 
Defendant were on very bad terms at that point and 
it would not have been contemplated by either party 
that Plaintiff would continue to stay in the house 
and pay rent against which the loan could be 
credited. 
[7] Under the terms of the lease and the civil 
code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 4052, Plaintiff was 
obligated to continue paying rent as long as he 
remained in possession, and he was in arrears 
as of the time of Defendant's arrival. He 
clearly was not obligated, however, to pay rent 
for the period after he was excluded from the 
property. Taking into account the rent and 
security deposit paid by Plaintiff, the Court 
finds, therefore, that Plaintiff owes Defendant 
$60 for rent for the period between January 
15th and 27th, during which he was in 
possession. Defendant is not entitled to collect 
rent for the period after January 27, 1988 
during which Plaintiff was seeking through 
the legal process to regain access to the 
property. 
[8] Defendant also seeks $1000 for damages 
to the house caused by Plaintiffs negligence 
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and failure to maintain the property in good 
condition. Under the lease itself and under 
the Puerto Rican Civil Code, the lessee has a 
duty to use the leasehold as would a diligent 
father of a family. 31 L.P.R.A. § 4052. The 
Code also makes the lessee liable for the 
deterioration suffered by the thing leased, 
unless he proves that it took place without his 
fault. 31 L.P.R.A. § 4060; see Cabinero v. 
Cobian; Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 81 P.R.R. 926 
(1960). The Court has found that Plaintiff left 
the house dirty and that his lack of care had 
caused it to become infested. Defendant 
testified that he spent about $700 for an 
exterminator's services. Plaintiff is 
responsible for this expense. 
Although Defendant testified that Plaintiff 
had ruined the stove, the Court cannot award 
the $300 damages Defendant seeks for having 
replaced it. First, although the photographs of 
the stove show a degraded kitchen appliance, 
as described above, the Court cannot have 
complete confidence in the photographs as 
showing the condition of the stove when 
Defendant arrived. If the photographs are 
accurate, it seems very unlikely that the stove 
could have been in perfect condition and 
arrived in such a state in the three months of 
Plaintiffs tenancy. In the pictures it appears 
very rusty and old looking as well as dirty. 
David Loperena's testimony confirms this 
observation. He stated, and the Court 
believes his testimony over that of Defendant 
on this point, that when Plaintiff moved in 
*131 there was an old, run down stove in the 
house with only two working burners. 
Although Defendant testified to the stove 
being dirty and encrusted with grease, that in 
itself would not require its replacement. The 
Court cannot find, therefore, that the stove, 
was ruined during Plaintiff's tenancy so that 
it required replacement. 
Defendant also testified that he had to 
replace cranks on the windows in the house. 
Defendant could not recall how many cranks 
he replaced, but he estimated that he replaced 
ten at $10 apiece. There was no testimony 
that all the cranks were in working order 
when Plaintiff entered the leasehold, and 
given the photo showing damage to one crank, 
the Court finds it unlikely that Plaintiff broke 
ten in the course of a three month tenancy. 
The Court is not satisfied from the evidence 
before it that ten window cranks worth $100 
were destroyed during Plaintiffs tenancy. 
Defendant also testified that he bought grass 
seed to reseed the lawn. He did not testify 
how much it cost, so he has not proved that 
element of damage. Also, while Defendant 
testified that he did most of the work required 
to put the house back in proper condition, 
there is no evidence from which the Court 
might translate this testimony into a damages 
award. 
[9] Defendant's third counterclaim seeks 
attorney's fees under a clause in the contract 
requiring Plaintiff to pay reasonable expenses 
arising out of a legal action due to a breach of 
contract. Defendant presented no evidence on 
this claim and has not addressed it in his 
brief. The issue is, therefore, waived. Collins 
v. Marina-Martinez, 894 F.2d 474, 481 n. 9 
(1st Cir.1990) ( "It is settled beyond 
peradventure that issues mentioned in a 
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by any 
effort at developed argumentation are deemed 
waived.") 
[10] Defendant also seeks $200,000 for 
mental anguish and emotional distress caused 
by Plaintiff's lawsuit and the destruction of 
Defendant's property. Although the Court has 
found no damages for Plaintiff, it did find that 
Defendant had wrongfully interfered with 
Plaintiff's peaceful enjoyment of the 
leasehold. The suit is, therefore, not frivolous. 
The asserted "destruction" of Defendant's 
property has turned out to be merely that 
Plaintiff left the house dirty, a condition 
remediable by Defendant in a few days. The 
Court is not persuaded by Defendant's 
testimony that because he was very 
"disappointed" and angry at the condition of 
his "dream" house, his mental condition has 
been considerably affected or that in " 'some 
appreciable measure the health, welfare and 
happiness of the claimant were really 
affected.' " Riofrio Anda v. Ralston Purina 
Co., 772 F.Supp. at 53. Since Defendant was 
willing to rent the house in the first place, his 
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not bear any change in its condition. 
Moreover, since he required a security deposit, 
he must have contemplated and accepted the 
possibility of an outcome of the rental 
situation similar to that which occurred. 
Defendant has not made a showing of mental 
distress adequate to require compensation in 
damages. 
[11] Finally, Defendant has not presented 
evidence or argument on his counterclaim for 
slander. That counterclaim is therefore 
deemed waived. Collins v. Marina-Martinez, 
894 F.2d at 481 n. 9. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is 
liable to Defendant in the amount of $760 for 
unpaid rent and for his failure to care for 
Defendant's property as required by law. 
SO ORDERED. 
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